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Christian Influences On The Mabinogi
Josh Pittman
Campbell University
he Mabinogion, specifically the Four Branches of 
The Mabinogi, is almost universally considered 
a sophisticated work of literature. As they would do for 
any well-developed work of art, critics analyze the Four 
Branches looking for themes and author-intended morals. 
These themes and morals, in turn, are developed mainly 
by parallels between and within Branches. Modern critical 
interpretations of The Mabinogi have emphasized themes 
arising from the well of Welsh mythology. However, certain 
similarities strongly suggest that the Christian narrative 
T
2dramatically influenced the redactor of The Mabinogi: 
parallels between Christ and various noble characters in 
the Welsh tales; a counter-cultural insistence upon the 
undesirability of violence; and a reverent treatment of 
the Otherworld all bespeak the Christian concerns of the 
redactor.
Catherine McKenna has remarked of the First Branch, 
Pwyll, Prince of Dyfed, that it portrays a king coming 
to sovereignty and a king coming to wisdom. Both of 
these interpretations merit credence; however, a complete 
appreciation of these theories will include an appreciation of 
the similarity between The Mabinogi and Beowulf inasmuch 
as both seek to reconcile their cultural heritages with the new 
Christian religion. As J.R.R. Tolkien suggests of Beowulf, 
two contradictory influences play into The Mabinogi: “both 
new faith and new learning…and also a body of native 
tradition…for the changed mind to contemplate together” 
(71). The redactor of the Welsh tales, like the Beowulf 
poet, fully participates in neither the new Roman faith and 
learning nor the old Celtic tradition, “feeling [their worths] 
more poetically because he was himself removed” (73). 
That is, the redactor straddled the boundary between old 
and new, his proximity to each allowing him to appreciate 
their interplay, but his separation from each allowing him to 
view them with poetic nostalgia. Siewers also suggests this, 
calling the Four Branches “filled with both ancestral wisdom 
and ancient [C]hristian precedence” (196). Thus, although 
the Christian influences upon The Mabinogi are substantially 
demonstrated, this body of evidence will not in the least 
3lessen the importance to the text of the Welsh mythology 
noted by other scholars.
McKenna traces the mythological roots of Rhiannon, 
the magical wife of the First Branch’s protagonist, thus 
providing perhaps the most substantial support for the view 
that Pwyll is meant to recount a ruler’s rise to sovereignty. 
As the sovereignty goddess, Rhiannon is one “whose hand 
must be won by any aspirant to kingship.” Not only her 
“equine associations” but also “her supernatural power, 
her independent strong-mindedness in choosing a husband, 
and her superior wisdom” link her to other sovereignty 
goddesses, “such as the Irish Medb” (317). McKenna 
supports her argument soundly and convincingly; however, 
she overlooks other implications these allusions to a goddess 
may have had to a medieval Welsh audience. Rhiannon’s 
roots may be in Celtic mythology, but in the full bloom of 
The Mabinogi, her qualities also hearken to Christ.
The parallels between Rhiannon and Christ begin 
with the former’s first appearance in the story. When the 
main character, Pwyll, first sees Rhiannon, he beholds 
a creature clearly Otherworldly, if not divine. Thus, 
Rhiannon’s choosing to travel from her Otherworld home 
to Pwyll’s dominion makes her analogous to Christ, who 
alone “descended from heaven” (John 3:13). The fact that 
Rhiannon comes from the Otherworld to bestow sovereignty 
on Pwyll specifically by marriage strengthens this parallel. 
Similarly, Christ came to earth to restore man, “by the 
washing of water with the word” in order to make the 
Church, the Bride of Christ, “holy and blameless” (Eph. 
45:26, 27). Thus, Christ’s marriage to the Church gives men 
the ability to be “born again” (John 3:3) and to be made 
“sons of God through faith in Christ Jesus” (Gal. 3:26).
Rhiannon’s wisdom also reminds one of Christ. When 
Pwyll foolishly offers to give anything to his disguised 
rival suitor Gwawl, Rhiannon takes the blunder in stride. 
She accepts Pwyll’s foolish decision but proceeds to outwit 
Gwawl, beating him at his own game, so to speak. Thus, 
Pwyll gains the sovereignty goddess not through battle but 
by unexpected means, becoming for a time a lowly beggar 
(McKenna 316). Christ employed similar tactics in that He 
redeemed mankind by unexpected means. Instead of through 
battle, as Peter would have preferred, Christ saved His 
creation through His humiliation and death. He did not strike 
down Satan by an obvious display of power but, in a way, 
beat Satan at his own game, thereby allowing the sons of 
Adam to become sons of the King. 
This kind of reversal of expectations occurs frequently 
in the Bible; the following are but a few examples. The 
prophet Elijah experienced the presence of the Most High 
God not in a fierce storm or an earthquake or a fire but in 
the “gentle blowing” that followed (1Kings 19:12). Jesus’ 
very birth as an unassuming child, related by the Gospels 
of Matthew and Luke, reverses common expectations for 
the birth of an important person. The Sermon on the Mount 
asserts paradoxically that the downtrodden are blessed (Matt. 
5). Jesus describes the salvation at the very heart of the 
Christian faith in self-contradictory terms: “And I, if I am 
lifted up from the earth, will draw all men to Myself” (John 
512:32). Finally, the apostle Paul describes the resurrection of 
believers as a paradox: “That which you sow does not come 
to life unless it dies” (1 Cor. 15:36). 
Rhiannon’s role as sovereignty goddess continues in 
Manawydan. In this branch, Rhiannon no longer embodies 
wisdom, as that role has switched to Manawydan’s character, 
but she does still have the power to bestow sovereignty. 
No longer does she choose her own husband, but marriage 
to her still awards Manawydan sovereignty over Pwyll’s 
old kingdom, Dyfed. This fact again reinforces the notion 
that the road to kingship passes through the rite of mortal 
marriage to the divine.
The fact that Pwyll must join the Otherworldly with the 
mortal through his unification with a euhemerized goddess 
brings to mind the concept of the Word becoming flesh 
propounded in the Gospel of John. In order to become a 
full regent, to become who he was meant to be, Pwyll must 
achieve reconciliation with the divine. Together, the human 
and the divine can ensure full protection and fertility to their 
people.
Just as Pwyll marries the Otherworldly Rhiannon for 
the good of his people, so Christ became human to provide 
salvation for His church. The Gospel of John asserts that 
“The Word became flesh” (John 1:14), and orthodox 
theologians have interpreted this to mean that Jesus was 
both the fully divine Son of God and the fully human Son of 
Man. St. Irenaeus says, “[N]or did He truly redeem us with 
His own blood, if He did not really become man” (chapter 
2). The pivotal scholastic theologian Thomas Aquinas also 
6writes, “Christ is said to be of heaven…either as to the virtue 
whereby it was formed; or even as to His very Godhead. 
But as to matter, Christ’s body was earthly” (2177). On the 
other hand, St. Anselm of Canterbury argues that Jesus must 
have been divine in order to effect the kind of salvation and 
“dignity” God intended for humanity (270). The mystery of 
Christ’s dual divinity and humanity recalls also the mystery 
of the Eucharist, in which, according to Roman Catholic 
doctrine, the bread and wine literally turns into into the very 
body and blood of Christ, His “true body” (Aquinas 2428). 
Thus, just as the Eucharist, an all-important sacrament, must 
be both food and Christ’s body and blood, so Christ’s own 
incarnation must be both human and divine. Likewise, just 
as Christ combines in one body both mortal and immortal to 
effect the salvation of the human race, so Pwyll must secure 
his own union with the divine Rhiannon in order to bring 
about his people’s prosperity.
Rhiannon’s merciful reaction to Gwawl also makes her 
comparable to Christ. Whereas Pwyll and his men, after 
capturing the trickster, kick him until he has “received great 
bruises” (Mabinogion 16), Rhiannon convinces Pwyll to 
let Gwawl go after making the latter promise never to seek 
revenge for his bruises. Once again, Rhiannon demonstrates 
greater wisdom than Pwyll, this time because she recognizes 
the excellence of mercy.
Nevertheless, Pwyll’s initial lack of forgiveness does 
lead to unpleasant consequences for his son. The redactor 
reveals at the end of Manawydan that Pryderi, Pwyll’s son, 
and Rhiannon owe their abduction into the Otherworld to 
7Pwyll’s treatment of Gwawl in the First Branch. Likewise, 
when Gwawl’s servant Llwyd seeks revenge against Pwyll’s 
descendants, his lack of forgiveness almost results in his 
wife’s execution. In Branwen, the Irish nobles’ inability to 
forgive the temperamental Efnisien for insulting their king 
causes them to force the king to shun his new wife and 
Efnisien’s sister, Branwen. This shunning, in turn, leads 
to the invasion of Ireland by Branwen’s mighty brother 
Brandigeidfran and the virtual destruction of two countries. 
The Christian virtues of forgiveness and mercy, then, play an 
indispensable role in keeping the peace. 
The Christian emphasis on mercy and forgiveness is 
almost axiomatic. Jesus’ Sermon on the Mount, in which He 
paints a picture of the Christian life, pronounces blessings on 
both the merciful and the peacemakers (Matt. 5:7, 9). Later, 
Jesus tells a parable of a servant forgiven of a large debt 
to his master. This same servant then abuses and threatens 
a fellow servant who owes him much less money than he 
owed his master. Upon hearing of this, the master promptly 
throws the first servant into prison. Jesus concludes the 
parable with these words: “My heavenly Father will also do 
the same to you, if each of you does not forgive his brother 
from your heart” (Matt. 18:35). Having been forgiven of 
their sins by God, Christians are expected to forgive others, 
not only seven times but also the symbolic “seventy times 
seven times” (Matt. 18:22)—that is, indefinitely. Christians 
must show forgiveness because “judgment will be merciless 
to one who has shown no mercy; mercy triumphs over 
judgment” (James 2:13). Manawydan demonstrates perfectly 
8the superiority of mercy over judgment by using mercy to set 
the world aright again.
The concept of forgiveness, or the lack thereof, also 
greatly affects the Four Branches in that it colors the 
redactor’s portrayal of violence. The First Branch begins 
with low-key violence as Pwyll does battle with his 
Otherworldly foe Hafgan. Several aspects of this contest 
warrant inquiry. First, battle is, by implication, a just 
way of establishing hegemony in Annwn, the Otherworld 
kingdom to which Pwyll is sent. This has one of two possible 
implications for the rest of the Four Branches. If the redactor 
accepts battle as an acceptable way of gaining a kingdom, 
perhaps he does not actually condemn the terrible violence 
of Math, and perhaps his claim in that Branch that Caswallan 
has done Manawydan wrong is hypocritical. On the other 
hand, the battle in Annwn takes place between Pwyll and 
Hafgan only, as opposed to between two whole armies. 
A comparable concept controls Pwyll’s charge—he must 
only deal Hafgan a single stroke. Taken together, these two 
details extol mitigated violence. The moral seems to be that 
belligerents must control their violence responsibly. The 
terror of the rest of the battles in the Four Branches, then, 
arises from their overshooting Aristotle’s target of the golden 
mean. After all, the final peace between the kingdoms of 
Math and Pryderi follows a one-on-one duel between Pryderi 
and the sorcerer Gwydion.
The historical context of The Mabinogi adds significance 
to the theme of mitigated violence. Written probably 
between A.D. 1060 and 1100 (Charles-Edwards 44), the text 
9came into its own in a country under the sway of the Roman 
Catholic Church. Siewers assesses Welsh culture at the time 
as undergoing “conversion to [C]hristianity in a period and 
manner that fostered construction of cultural continuity with 
ancestral traditions of the land” (198). The Catholic Church 
perpetually fought to limit the medieval European culture 
of war, instituting regulations such as the Peace of God and 
the Truce of God, and the Mabinogi redactor undoubtedly 
absorbed this concern with peace. 
Ideally, the Peace of God “was to place under special 
ecclesiastical protection certain classes of persons, such as 
monks, the clergy, and the poor” (Cowdrey 42). Initiated 
about a generation after the Peace (42), the Truce, first 
proclaimed in 1027, forbade all violence on certain days, 
originally Sunday (44). Cowdrey does well explaining the 
difference between the two legislations: “Whereas the Peace 
sought to protect certain classes and their goods at all times, 
the Truce was an attempt to stop all violence at certain 
times” (44). The author calls the Truce “part of churchmen’s 
endeavors to propagate peace” (44). 
Churchmen had concerned themselves with propagating 
peace for a long time. Jesus’ teachings of forgiveness and 
turning the other cheek obviously influenced the Church’s 
position on violence, but by the eleventh century, the Church 
no longer accepted complete pacifism. The tradition of 
Christian limited war had influenced mainstream Christian 
thought since St. Augustine (Johnson 14) although just war 
did not become “systematic” until the time of Catholic monk 
and lawyer Gratian in “the middle of the twelfth century” 
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(Johnson 14). The Mabinogi redactor’s focus on limiting 
violence, then, fits into the Catholic trend of curbing the 
violent medieval way of life, specifically during the eleventh 
century, as well as into the Biblical theme of  encouraging 
“the peacekeepers.” 
Violence also relates to the motif of travel. One critic 
points out that danger often accompanies travel in the Four 
Branches (Jones 214). Pwyll stays mostly within his own 
realm, and most travel in Math entails war. Likewise, the 
journeys of the Irish king Matholwch and the giant king 
Brandigeidfran result in a war that decimates two nations. 
Less catastrophically but still eerily, the characters in 
Manawydan are threatened with violence and death wherever 
they go in the foreign land of Lloegyr (Jones 214-215). In an 
age less mobile than the modern, travel probably did usually 
originate from either displacement or belligerent ambition. 
A footnote in Siewers’s article relates that in the eleventh 
century, self-consciousness of being a distinct people from 
their Anglo-Saxon neighbors was just beginning to creep into 
the minds of the Welsh (196). Foreigners, like the Normans 
and Vikings, invaded from outside the bounds of Wales, and 
the Welsh who moved were forced to do so by the invaders. 
The Welsh, then, traveled under the compunction of others’ 
lust for their land.
The aversion to violence evident in The Mabinogi 
stands in contrast to the celebration of martial force found in 
comparable texts such as Beowulf and Judith. Although some 
critics have posited good arguments suggesting that Beowulf 
propounds a nuanced conception of violence, the poet 
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certainly does not emphasize forgiveness to the extent the 
Mabinogi redactor does.   One critic argues that violence in 
Beowulf performs the function of justice and is illegitimately 
exercised when used, for example, to settle feuds (Hill 37). 
However, the culture of the poem has deep roots in tribal 
loyalties, which call for the destruction of one’s relatives’ 
enemies. Beowulf, for instance, boasts of having “avenged 
the Geats (their enemies brought it / upon themselves)” 
(Beowulf 423-424). Thus, the Beowulf poet seems to approve 
of feuds if they meet certain criteria; that is, one may engage 
in feuding if his enemies bring the feud “upon themselves.” 
The poet does not clearly state how one calls feud violence 
upon himself, but it seems that Beowulf accepts violence to 
an extent that the Mabinogi redactor never would.  Although 
feuding under certain conditions sounds like the doctrine of 
just war, Beowulf differs from The Mabinogi in that it sees 
no solution to the cyclical violence of the age. Upon the 
death of the poem’s hero, his people stand in an unenviable 
position, “anticipating raids and revenge-feud on three sides” 
(Hill 61). Beowulf makes no mention of an ultimate divine 
justification of human deeds, no reassurance that peace will 
eventually triumph—indeed, much of the poem’s beauty 
stems from this despair. The Mabinogi, on the other hand, 
upholds limited violence and even forgiveness. Both Pryderi 
and Brandigeidfran die in the end, but their deaths result 
from foolish decisions which greater wisdom (on Pryderi’s 
part) or forgiveness (on the parts of Efnisien and the Irish 
nobles) would have prevented, and the conflicts in the story 
do ultimately come to an end.
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Similarly, Judith has no mention of mercy. Rather, the 
reader is not to question the evil character of the villain 
Holofernes, and Judith owes her position as a laudable 
heroine to her very lack of equivocation concerning her 
assassination of Holofernes. Indeed, Judith invokes God’s 
mercy only to ask for strength to kill “the heathen man” 
(98). Also in “Cynewulf and Cyneheard,” none of the 
characters even considers forgiveness an option. Because 
the king, Sigeberht, has committed “unjust acts,” Cynewulf 
overthrows him and sets about establishing his own 
hegemony. When the previous king’s brother, Cyneheard, 
becomes a problem, Cynewulf seeks to kill him. Lastly, upon 
hearing of the death of their king and kinsman, Cyneheard’s 
knights reject offers of truce from Cynewulf, instead 
choosing to kill the usurper and all but one of his men (37-
38).
Although the prospect is tempting, one must not 
dismissively attribute the conceptions of violence in The 
Mabinogi to its national origins. That is, the redactor of the 
Four Branches did not lose his taste for violence because he 
was a sore loser. Even other Welsh literature shows signs 
of glorifying violence—including the other tales of The 
Mabinogion. For example, Culhwch and Olwen contains 
an epic description of Culhwch’s arms (Mabinogion 97), a 
list of Culhwch’s ancestors (100-107), and a catalogue of 
the feats of Arthur’s knights (107-108). These knights’ fame 
derives from their martial prowess; Bedwyr, for example, 
“though he was one-handed no three warriors drew blood in 
the same field faster than he” (108).
Clearly, The Mabinogi came to bloom in a sanguinary 
13
culture dangling somewhere between the tribal days of 
Beowulf and the feudal times of the Arthurian romances. 
Nevertheless, despite the prevalence of violence in 
its society—even within the physical bindings of The 
Mabinogion—the redactor of the Four Branches asserts 
a counter-cultural aversion to violence and preference 
for creative pacifism. Whereas the predominant literary 
culture apparently did not provide him with this influence, 
Christian tradition certainly has the potential to have 
instilled just war tendencies in an author of folk stories. 
Given the other parallels between the Christian narrative 
and the Four Branches, Christianity very likely had a much 
larger influence upon The Mabinogi redactor’s views than 
paganism or contemporary culture.
Returning to Rhiannon, one next notices that “teachers 
and wise men” (Mabinogion 19) sentence her to carry 
travelers on her back in penance for a crime she did not 
commit. In the same way, Christ’s ultimate show of humility 
began when He, though innocent, was condemned to die. 
Even the Roman official responsible for His condemnation, 
Pilate, declares to the Jews who want Jesus killed, 
“[N]othing deserving death has been done by Him” (Luke 
23:15). His passion and death express most fully His 
mission to bear the burdens of humanity. Thus, just as Christ 
acts as a Christian’s bridge to the Father’s presence, the 
“one mediator…between God and men” (1 Tim. 2:5), so 
Rhiannon’s humility—or humiliation—allows her to carry 
travelers to the king.
The theme of self-sacrifice, though present in Rhiannon’s 
tale, emerges more explicitly in the Second Branch. Branwen 
14
begins the self-sacrificial peacemaking process by allowing 
herself to be given in marriage to Matholwch. By marrying 
the Irish king, she leaves the presence of her brother, whose 
great stature clearly identifies him as a partially divine 
character. She, like Christ, leaves the presence of the King to 
live with those of lesser greatness and effect peace between 
the two realms. Of course, Branwen does not completely 
fulfill a Christ type because she, by her own confession, 
causes the destruction of two islands. Unlike Christ, who 
“humbled himself by becoming obedient to the point of 
death” (Philip. 2:8), Branwen calls her brother to rescue her 
by invading Ireland—with tragic consequences.
Efnisien also exhibits self-sacrifice in Branwen. 
Although throughout most of the story he maliciously 
causes trouble, Efnisien redeems himself in the end through 
self-sacrifice. Because the Irish possess the cauldron of 
rebirth, the war Efnisien causes threatens to annihilate his 
countrymen; however, after realizing his guilt, he throws 
himself into the cauldron and breaks it, simultaneously 
breaking his own heart. In this way, Efnisien leaves the 
story, and the mortal world, as a good character. Though 
not innocent like Christ, Efnisien does make a Christ-like 
sacrifice.
Brandigeidfran undeniably provides the most explicit 
Christ type in the Second Branch, however. Throughout 
the story, Brandigeidfran excels in his role as a righteous, 
generous king. He gives his sister to Matholwch in order to 
make peace, he compensates Matholwch much past what 
the insult requires when Efnisien offends the Irish king, 
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and he attacks Ireland only in defense of the helpless. His 
willingness to make peace mirrors God’s willingness to 
reconcile man to Himself by giving His Son in marriage to 
His redeemed Church. Brandigeidfran’s generosity ties him 
not only to the ideal king of Anglo-Saxon tradition (whom 
Beowulf would call the “ring-giver” [1486]) but also to 
the Christian virtues of forgiveness and mercy that Pwyll 
so conspicuously lacks. His willingness to forgive has the 
capacity to end the possible hostility between his kingdom 
and Ireland, except that the Irish nobles keep their grudge 
and pressure Matholwch to punish Branwen. He again 
attempts to preclude violence through forgiveness when the 
Irish build a house for him and promise to let his nephew 
reign in Matholwch’s stead, but Efnisien kills the child. 
Indeed, the hostilities begin in the first place only because 
of Brandigeidfran’s need to protect Branwen from her 
persecutors. Thus, Brandigeidfran gives generously, forgives, 
protects, and tries to make peace—all Christ-like activities a 
ruler should imitate.
The most Christ-like of Brandigeidfran’s laudable 
qualities, however, is his self-sacrifice. When a spear in 
the foot—a possible reference to Achilles or even to Eve’s 
descendant’s being bruised on the heel (Gen. 3:15)—begins 
to sap the life from him, the king commands his friends 
to cut off his head and bury it in London, facing France. 
As long as it remains under the soil of London, the head 
will protect the island from invasion. The king’s sacrifice, 
therefore, saves a multitude of his subjects from external 
malice. In the same way, Christ submitted to execution for 
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the sake of His followers (John 10:18). The salvation He 
offers does not depend on His staying buried; rather, Paul 
cites His resurrection as the proof of His saving power (1 
Cor. 15:14). Still, as the Head of the Church (Eph. 5:23), the 
risen Jesus protects Christians from the malice of Satan, who 
seeks to devour Christians like a lion (1 Peter 5:8).
To return for the last time to Rhiannon, one notices 
the manner of the queen’s reinstatement. She regains her 
innocence and rightful place at the king’s side only after 
the return of her son. Likewise, “because of the suffering 
of death,” Christ is “crowned with glory and honor, so that 
by the grace of God He might taste death for everyone” 
(Heb. 2:9). In other words, having secured salvation for 
His followers, Christ received the glory He had before His 
incarnation. Both Christ and Rhiannon suffer vicarious 
punishment for sins they did not commit, and both regain 
their former glories after their suffering.
Despite numerous parallels, one major discrepancy 
makes Rhiannon different from Christ, namely their genders. 
A male-dominated society would have frowned upon 
referring to Christ as a woman. However, a few precedents 
blunt the importunity of such reference. Firstly, Christ refers 
to Himself as a mother hen in the Gospel of Luke (Luke 
13:34). Secondly, an ancient Hebrew tradition identifies 
wisdom as female; Proverbs personifies Wisdom as a woman 
who stands in the streets and cries out (Prov. 1). Christ, 
as logos (John 1), and Rhiannon may both be considered 
wisdom personified. Thus, there can be no absolute ban on 
referring to Christ as female.
17
McKenna’s mention of Rhiannon’s wisdom leads to an 
analysis of the comparative wisdom of other characters in 
the Four Branches, the first of whom is Pwyll. McKenna 
interprets the whole First Branch as Pwyll’s journey 
toward wisdom as a result of Arawn’s lessons (321-323), 
and a footnote reports that Pwyll’s name means “Sense” 
(Mabinogion 23). Indeed, Pwyll’s and Pryderi’s stories 
dramatize patterns of foolishness and wisdom rather 
strongly.
Pwyll first appears as a foolishly prideful prince driving 
another’s dogs away from a stag and taking the animal for 
himself. Certainly, as Arawn’s reaction shows, Pwyll acts 
foolishly in this. The prince soon redeems himself, however, 
by obeying Arawn’s requests. He shows his discerning 
side both by refusing to strike Hafgan more than once and 
by refusing to sleep with Arawn’s wife. His wisdom in 
these two areas earns him the title Head of Annwn as well 
as friendship with Arawn that benefits Pryderi even after 
Pwyll’s death. As Gantz highlights, the second episode of 
the First Branch repeats this pattern of selfish pride followed 
by more discerning wisdom (267). In the second episode, 
after the exposition in which Pwyll meets Rhiannon, 
Pwyll foolishly promises too much to Gwawl. He again 
has the chance to redeem himself, however, by following 
Rhiannon’s instructions. Having captured Gwawl, instead of 
demonstrating increased humility, Pwyll once more behaves 
proudly, treating Gwawl with unnecessary cruelty. Once 
again, Rhiannon’s instructions curb Pwyll’s lack of mercy 
and allow him to escape retaliation—though his son will still 
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bear the vengeance for this act. Gantz overlooks, however, 
the important manifestation of Pwyll’s foolishness when the 
prince first meets Rhiannon. Instead of taking the sensible 
approach and calling out to her, Pwyll proudly sends his 
fastest horses after Rhiannon. Indeed, when he finally does 
admit that he cannot overtake her, Rhiannon chides him, 
saying it would have been better for his horses if he had 
simply asked earlier.
In each of these episodes, Pwyll’s pride informs his 
foolishness and threatens to come before his fall. He claims 
Arawn’s stag presumably because he assumes no one 
outranking him would hunt in his dominions (McKenna 
322). He fails to call out to Rhiannon because his pride will 
not allow him to admit he cannot catch her. Infected by 
the headiness of pride, he promises Gwawl whatever the 
other would ask. Finally, proud of having caught Gwawl, 
he tortures his vanquished enemy without considering the 
possibility that he may start a feud. Foolishness and pride, 
then, are linked inextricably. 
Pwyll’s willingness to humble himself and obey 
directions provides him with freedom from the consequences 
of his pride in each episode. He obeys Arawn’s injunction 
not to strike Hafgan twice, Rhiannon’s suggestion on how to 
catch Gwawl, and Rhiannon and her father’s plea not to kill 
Gwawl in a bag. He meets Rhiannon only after he humbles 
himself enough to admit he cannot catch her. In the final 
episode of the First Branch, his humility leads him to obey 
the wishes of his nobles—now that he has learned from 
Arawn how to obey others (McKenna 323)—who worry he 
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will have no heir.
Pryderi suffers from a similar character flaw. His pride 
first manifests itself when, in Lloegyr, he wants to fight 
the tradesmen who plot to kill him and Manawydan. As 
Manawydan informs him, fighting would only provoke the 
authorities to imprison them. Nevertheless, each time the 
tradesmen conspire against the two main characters, Pryderi 
wants to stand and fight. Also, when a strange castle appears 
where there had been no castle before, Pryderi proudly 
rushes in after his dogs, possibly desiring to prove his 
lordship over the lands he hunts. In fact, he proves nothing 
but his impetuosity.
If Pryderi inherits his father’s flaws, he also inherits 
Pwyll’s redeeming characteristics of generosity and 
friendship. Pryderi’s initial gifts to Manawydan of Rhiannon 
as wife and Dyfed as property guarantee Manawydan’s 
loyalty throughout the story—a loyalty which saves Pryderi 
from both starvation and exile to the Otherworld. The 
redactor never shows Pryderi humble himself. Instead, 
Pryderi rashly trades, against his agreement with Arawn, all 
the pigs he has received from Annwn for the apparitional 
creatures fashioned by the scheming sorcerer Gwydion, thus 
bringing his dynasty to an end.
Manawydan, on the other hand, exemplifies patient 
humility. Though the cousin of Brandigeidfran, he claims no 
right to the throne when he returns to Wales from Ireland, 
just as Christ came into the world humbly. Despite his 
noble birth, he does not disdain to work as a cobbler, shield 
maker, or saddle maker—nor would he have refused work 
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as a carpenter, one assumes. When the tradesmen of Lloegyr 
plot to kill him, he does not take umbrage but recognizes 
his vulnerability and flees. When his dogs chase an unusual-
looking boar into a castle that has appeared overnight, he 
does not rashly charge in but holds back. When he has 
caught one of the mice that have been destroying his wheat 
and a succession of clerics tries to persuade him to release 
the mouse, he refuses and presses his advantage until he 
has gained what he wants. In contrast to Pwyll, he knows 
instinctively to demand that Llwyd not take vengeance upon 
him. In all these situations, Manawydan shows discretion 
clearly the opposite of Pwyll’s and Pryderi’s impetuosity.
The importance of humility in Christianity is almost 
impossible to overemphasize. From the very birth of Christ 
in a manger (Luke 2) to His baptism by His inferior (Matt. 
3:13-15) and His ignominious death as a criminal, Jesus 
preferred accepting a humble role to exercising His divine 
power. Indeed, the Apostle Paul admonishes the Philippians 
to imitate Christ, who took “the form of a bondservant” and 
“humbled Himself by becoming obedient to the point of 
death” (Philip. 2:7, 8). Not only did Christ Himself accept 
ignominy, but He frequently encouraged His followers to 
humble themselves. His Sermon on the Mount proclaims, 
“Blessed are the gentle, for they shall inherit the earth” 
(Matt. 5:5). Similarly, He later takes a small child in His 
arms and says, “Whoever then humbles himself as this child, 
he is the greatest in the kingdom of heaven” (Matt. 18:4). He 
also states at one point, “For everyone who exalts himself 
will be humbled, and he who humbles himself will be 
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exalted” (Luke 14:11). James also says, “Humble yourselves 
in the presence of the Lord, and He will exalt you” (James 
4:10).
This necessity of humility is underscored not only in 
the New Testament but also in the Old. Throughout the 
Old Testament, God exalts the humble while humiliating 
the proud. To teach this lesson, He even curses King 
Nebuchadnezzar to spend seven years living as a beast 
(Daniel 5:20-21). God also commands the Israelites, through 
Moses, to spend a day of every year atoning for their sins, 
so that they would “humble [their] souls” (Lev. 16:29, 31). 
Even King Ahab, a classic example of an evil king, averts 
God’s judgment by humbling himself: “Do you see how 
Ahab has humbled himself before Me? Because he has 
humbled himself before Me, I will not bring the evil in his 
days, but I will bring the evil upon his house in his son’s 
days” (1 Kings 21:29). In summarizing His activities to Job, 
God says that He will “Look on everyone who is proud, and 
humble him” (Job 40:12). The Psalms frequently express 
hope that God will bless the humble. For example, Psalm 
37:11 declares, “But the humble will inherit the land and will 
delight themselves in abundant prosperity.”
The redactor of The Mabinogi internalizes the concept 
of humility so central to Biblical righteousness and seems 
to imply that interactions with the Otherworld require the 
humility praised by the Biblical writers. Only humility saves 
Pwyll from Arawn’s wrath and causes him to become Head 
of Annwn; humility establishes Pwyll as a just king after his 
identity trade with Arawn; only with humility could he meet 
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Rhiannon; and humility allows him to become respected 
enough that Teyrnon is willing to return Pryderi (McKenna 
325-326). In each of these cases, Pwyll’s encounter with 
the Otherworld has a positive outcome only when the king 
shows humility.
Properly applied, this principle will also govern 
interactions with the Christian God. In his essay on The 
Mabinogi as a “Welsh Old Testament” (196), Siewers argues 
medieval monasticism led to an “appreciation of the role 
of the physical in spiritual life” so that ecclesiastic sites 
became Otherworld portals (198). In this euhemerizing of 
the land, the Celtic creativity that gave rise to the myths 
of the gods channeled its creativity into mythologizing 
Christianity. Thus, what once symbolized ambiguous 
connections to a mythical world of magic now came to 
symbolize connections to the Christian God; from a Roman 
perspective, the Celts incorporated Christian churches into 
their eccentric worldview. Given this tendency of medieval 
Celtic minds, it is likely that the redactor of The Mabinogi 
applies the necessity of reverence in interaction with the 
Otherworld to interactions with the Christian God. That is, 
he uses his mythology to instill in his audience reverence for 
the spiritual, which in his time would mean reverence for the 
Catholic Church. After all, the Church alone had the power 
to grant or deny salvation through the sacraments. Although 
written after The Mabinogi, Pope Boniface VIII’s papal bull 
Unam Sanctam expresses this idea well: “there is one holy 
Catholic and Apostolic Church, outside of which there is 
neither salvation nor remission of sins.”  Any Welshman who 
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aspired to heaven, then, would do well to treat the Church 
with reverence.
A careful analysis of the comparisons and contrasts 
implied by The Mabinogi’s repeated variations on recurring 
situations and character traits reveals a strong Christian 
influence that is commonly overlooked in favor of pagan 
influences. Rhiannon’s character, in its implications of 
human unity with the divine, strongly supports the parallel 
with Christ. The three self-sacrificial characters in Branwen 
and their implications for the redactor’s view of violence 
in Math, extol Christ-like qualities, especially in rulers. 
The depiction of violence, much more likely influenced 
by Christianity than by paganism, particularly emphasizes 
forgiveness and mercy. Finally, Pwyll’s and Pryderi’s 
foolishness, contrasted with Manawydan’s exemplary 
wisdom, displays the necessity of reverence for spiritual 
matters. All these characteristics and attributes and their 
moral lessons make The Mabinogi an example of Christ’s 
fulfillment of the Celtic concept of divinity.
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Anticipative Feminism in F. Scott Fitzgerald’s 
This Side of Paradise and Flappers and Philosophers
Andrew Riccardo
Messiah College
ou’ve got a lot of courage to carry around a 
pink book,” my friend said to me one day.  She 
referred to the paperback of F. Scott Fitzgerald’s Flappers 
and Philosophers clasped loosely in my hand, back cover 
awash in fuchsia, front adorned with the portrait of a lady 
staring moodily off into the distance.  Some might have 
reckoned the design merely the isolated interpretation of 
the good people at Pocket Books, paying the matter no 
second thought.  A quick scan over my other Fitzgerald 
books, however, revealed a steady trend.  My Barnes & 
“Y
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Noble edition of The Beautiful and Damned bathed itself 
in soft pink hues, while others dressed themselves in violet 
elegance.
A commercially-minded reading of Fitzgerald might 
lend itself toward exploiting the stereotypically romantic 
side of his work.  Compared to writing friend Ernest 
Hemingway’s terse grunts on bullfighting, Fitzgerald comes 
off markedly more loquacious and sentimental.  His short 
stories fill themselves with young insecure adolescents 
and haughty debutantes.  Keeping this in mind, I never 
felt intimidated by the publishers’ decision to feminize 
the exterior of Fitzgerald texts.  When I was younger, I 
had enough blind faith in my masculine interpretation of 
Fitzgerald to disregard interpretations of him which said 
otherwise.  I related strongly to the picaresque, boyhood 
image of Fitzgerald; men often play the role of hero in 
Fitzgerald’s novels.  Frequently, the conflicts of his novels 
involve said males feeling profoundly slighted by their 
female counterparts, forced to deal with the trauma of 
feminine betrayal.  At times, his female characters can come 
across less deserving of sympathy.  In The Great Gatsby, 
Daisy Buchanan ultimately chooses the boorish Tom over 
the titular Jay.  In Tender is the Night, Dick and Nicole 
Divers’ marriage disintegrates—she running off with family 
friend Tommy Barban.  In Fitzgerald’s final unfinished piece, 
The Love of the Last Tycoon, protagonist Monroe Stahr’s fall 
from Hollywood production power is precipitated in part by 
the entrance of his star-crossed love interest Kathleen Moore. 
Though readings evoking empathy with or attributing moral 
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high ground to males hardly stand as the absolute aesthetic 
responses all readers glean from Fitzgerald, I did not have 
to look far to find people who interpreted him in “my” 
way.  Even my own brother, who had read only Fitzgerald’s 
“Winter Dreams” in high school, suggested discussing the 
story in this paper, since character Judy Jones “is a real 
[expletive]” to protagonist Dexter Green.
However, as my worldview continues to broaden 
and I meet vantage points completely antithetical to my 
own, I have to reevaluate the decision to clothe Fitzgerald 
in a flowery dress.  Perhaps the front of Flappers and 
Philosophers contains an idly sitting woman not merely to 
sell a classic to the female demographic but because she 
truly belongs there.  One critic has said that studying the 
“gender implications” of Fitzgerald’s texts has made him 
question the notion of Fitzgerald as “anti-feminist” (Schiff 
2659).  Another critic argued that the earlier mentioned Judy 
Jones of “Winter Dreams” has been “consistently misread 
and woefully shortchanged” as “irresponsible,” claiming she 
is “so subtle and probing that… hasty commentators miss 
the point entirely” (Martin 161, 160).  When scrutinizing 
Fitzgerald from outside a hyper-masculine lens, I begin to 
concede that his male characters are not always blameless.  
Perhaps his female characters ought to be vindicated for their 
actions, empowered as they are through the demeanor and 
choice Fitzgerald grants them, even if he grants them such 
liberty unconsciously.  Was Fitzgerald anticipating future 
decades’ heightened standards for gender equality?  When 
readers orient Fitzgerald’s work in the context of 
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mid-twentieth century feminist ideals and ethics, his 
unwitting anticipation of feminist goals hardly seems an ill-
fitting stretch.
Of course, if people posit that an author anticipates later 
feminist aims, then they must provide a better definition 
for how they intend to use the word and fully explain the 
cultural context, historical period, and particular movement 
from which they draw the term. Unless otherwise noted, 
the term “feminism” will refer in this paper to second-wave 
feminism.  First-wave feminism refers to the movement 
which emerged in the mid-nineteenth century and spanned 
roughly until 1920, associated with figures such as Elizabeth 
Cady Stanton and Lucretia Mott (Dicker 21, 29).  While 
members of this wave would lobby and petition for equal 
educational opportunities for both genders, reproductive 
rights, Prohibition, and wardrobe liberties, they would 
predominantly fight for political equality in the form of 
women’s suffrage, culminating in the United States with the 
ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920 (Dicker 
26, 31, 52, 54).  This landmark achievement marked the 
close of the first wave.
In contradistinction, second-wave feminism began 
roughly in the early 1960s, as women began to realize the 
long-term effects of leaving their World War II factory jobs 
and returning to their roles as wives and housekeepers.  
Feeling suddenly unable to find satisfaction in the domestic 
sphere, many women pressed not only for the minimum 
political equality they achieved during feminism’s first 
wave but also for sociological, economic, occupational, and 
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psychological equality as well (Dicker 57).  Second-wave 
feminists touted the slogan “the personal is political” and 
strove to “extend the meaning of ‘the political’ to include 
areas of social life previously treated as ‘personal’ and 
positioned in the private realm of the household” (Mack-
Canty 154).  Such feminists sought a holistic equality that 
overarched all aspects of practical life and daily pertinent 
decision-making, not simply equality on an abstract, 
constitutional level.  Their aims reached beyond the mere 
transcendence of Victorian gender norms from which the 
first-wave members endeavored to disentangle themselves.
Among important second-wave feminists, Betty Friedan 
stood out as the prominent leader of the movement.  Few 
voices were louder or more influential than hers for spurring 
the second movement and fighting for female equality 
beyond the minimum.  She shed light on the various cultural 
discrepancies that existed between men and women despite 
the successful attainment of women’s suffrage.  Occupational 
opportunities remained at a minimum for women, while the 
monetary compensation they received was laughably small 
compared to that of men.  Though Friedan’s actions while 
heading up the National Organization for Women could 
come off militant at times (such as the 1970 Women’s Strike 
for Equality), readers should keep in mind the mid-twentieth 
century context in which she lived, one in which the term 
“domestic violence” did not yet exist in terms of husband-
on-wife spousal abuse (Dicker 57-58).  As recently as a few 
decades ago, women had not attained the legal protection 
they have today.
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For the purposes of this paper, however, one must further 
differentiate use of the term “feminism” from its third-
wave and “postfeminist” connotations.  Those women born 
in recent decades of the 80s, 90s, or beyond, who believe 
second-wave feminism achieved its goals and therefore 
render any need for further feminist movements useless, 
have been dubbed members of the “[p]ost-feminist [g]
eneration” (Dicker 107).  Those who identify themselves 
as feminists today largely focus their efforts on issues of 
inequality involving women in particularized fields, women 
of other races, or women of other sexual orientations (Dicker 
110, 124).  Such women are said to belong to third-wave 
feminism.
Having feminism posited in its second-wave category, 
one must note that this paper will chiefly concern 
Fitzgerald’s role as an anticipative, proto-second-wave 
feminist in his early works, such as his first novel, This 
Side of Paradise, and his first collection of short stories, 
Flappers and Philosophers.  This Side of Paradise covers 
the young life of protagonist Amory Blaine.  The first part 
of the novel progresses from his early migrant childhood 
experiences with his mother Beatrice and prep school woes 
to his intellectual and social development at Princeton 
and brief stint in World War I.  Fitzgerald scatters boyish, 
romantic misadventures all along the way.  The second 
half depicts the adult Amory falling in love with debutante 
Rosalind Connage, only to find their relationship break apart, 
leaving him restless and wandering, trying to make sense 
of his fractured world.  The novel comes to a close with his 
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memorable epiphany “I know myself… but that is all” (260). 
Fitzgerald’s corresponding book of short stories from this 
era, Flappers and Philosophers, features works dealing with 
similar themes of youth.  Young men and women coping 
with the relational, social, economic, and political issues of 
coming of age in the late 1910s litter its pages.
People need not take too lengthy a pan over the shelves 
containing Fitzgerald studies at any college library to notice 
the overwhelming majority of scholarship on his famous 
novel The Great Gatsby.  His late masterpiece Tender is the 
Night has also merited copious scholarship, recent examples 
of which include pieces by Michael Nowlin and Tiffany 
Johnson.  Later short stories “The Rich Boy” and “Babylon 
Revisited” also receive due praise.  However, the author’s 
earliest work often does not receive such critical attention.  
When critics do turn their attention to This Side of Paradise, 
they tend to stress its historical value, relationship to the 
author’s biography, and the vagaries of its composition (an 
example being James L. West’s work).  The scholarship 
the book typically receives often highlights the novel’s 
blaring structural deficiencies or the errors that early editions 
contained due to negligent editing.  Notable Fitzgerald critic 
Matthew J. Bruccoli writes that “[m]uch has been said about 
[his] illiteracy, and This Side of Paradise has been singled 
out as the worst offender” (263).  In a study of Fitzgerald’s 
imagery,  Dan Seiters sees “few recognizable patterns” in the 
author’s debut work, emphasizing Fitzgerald’s “youth and 
inexperience” and “anxiety to get his novel published so that 
fame and fortune” would follow (15).
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A corresponding disparity exists among his short stories; 
the later works receive far more praise despite his early 
stories’ popularity.  Andrew Turnbull summarizes such 
scholarly consensus:  “The critics, on the whole, did not 
feel the collection [Flappers and Philosophers] fulfilled 
the promise of This Side of Paradise.  They warned of 
slick commercialism, an adman’s glamour, and Fitzgerald’s 
cocky tone seemed of a piece with his errors in grammar 
and syntax” (234). However, his early work provides the 
strongest evidence regarding his often overlooked feminist 
sentiments; This Side of Paradise and some of his short 
stories were penned prior to his marriage to Zelda Sayre, 
keeping readers from simply explaining away his early 
female characters’ strong wills or potentially cold demeanors 
as the mere mirroring of his tumultuous and “emasculating” 
marriage (Nowlin 63).  Moreover, some of his early material 
was drafted as early as 1917, prior to the close of World War 
I, the advent of the Roaring Twenties, and the ratification of 
the Nineteenth Amendment, giving readers a less culturally 
contaminated picture of the author than is commonly offered 
by The Great Gatsby (West 3).  Ultimately, his early prose 
received far less revision and therefore contains far fewer 
walls built up between author and audience, affording 
readers a more candid (albeit raw and undeveloped) 
Fitzgerald.
When taking into account Fitzgerald’s potential 
feminism, it becomes important to situate him in his Jazz 
Age historical context and to use this knowledge to explain 
the insufficiency of proving him a first-wave feminist.  In the 
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post-Great War era through which Fitzgerald completed the 
majority of his writing, a profound moral “disillusionment” 
had permeated Western culture due to the recent devastation 
witnessed in World War I.  Increasingly, people began to 
push the boundaries of previously implacable Victorian 
norms for sexuality and behavior, feeling traditional values 
had failed them (Newton-Matza 152).  Of course, vast 
social structures such as Victorian morality can hardly 
be toppled as the result of a single war, however massive 
and unprecedented its scope.  A disparity still existed 
between how men and women could behave sexually 
(150).  Embracing the liberality of the new era and opposing 
traditional sentiment from the previous century, many young 
women of the early 1920s began bobbing their hair and 
wearing flat clothing antithetical to Victorian female dress:  
“the new woman, the flapper” (Prigozy 131).  Flappers of 
the Jazz Age stood independent, “shameless, selfish, and 
honest… tak[ing] a man’s point of view as her mother never 
could” (131).   Fitzgerald’s work was certainly influenced 
by the era in which he wrote.  Despite having his early 
novel and short story collection published in 1920 before 
the zenith of the Roaring Twenties’ opulence, I understand 
the foolishness of not acknowledging the complex interplay 
that Fitzgerald not only had on his culture but also his 
culture had on him (West 3). However, his conception of 
feminism that appears in his work should not be understood 
as predominantly first-wave feminism in nature.  Proving 
such an assertion would be nothing more than nodding a 
yes to the question of whether he was profoundly influenced 
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by his time.  By proving Fitzgerald as a prophet of the 
later values of second-wave feminism, one attributes a 
transformative agency to Fitzgerald, a level of heightened 
respect that calling him only a first-wave feminist would 
deny him.  Considering the associations his early work 
has with the era of the flapper revolution circa 1922, the 
economic prosperity of the decade, or the ratification of the 
Nineteenth Amendment, proving such works as bearing 
proto-second-wave feminist sympathies would demonstrate 
Fitzgerald’s transcendence of his zeitgeist’s mere influence 
(interestingly, some critics even have attributed the “creation 
of the flapper” construct as we understand it today as an 
invention of the author himself) (Way 61).  When readers 
orient Fitzgerald’s This Side of Paradise and Flappers and 
Philosophers retrospectively through the lens of second-
wave feminist aims and ethics, keeping in consideration the 
insecurities Fitzgerald shouldered, they can interpret him in 
feminist terms.
Let us first consider the correlations between his stories 
and Betty Friedan’s works.  Friedan’s most groundbreaking 
and memorable book remains her 1963 The Feminine 
Mystique.  Friedan used this work as a mouthpiece to 
rail against mid-twentieth century American culture’s 
expectation for young women to aspire only to be 
“[t]he suburban housewife… healthy, beautiful, educated, 
concerned only about her husband, her children, her home,” 
thereby supposedly finding “true feminine fulfillment” 
(18).  The scenarios of Fitzgerald’s early works express an 
understanding of this lack of fulfillment which would come 
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to the public’s attention decades later.  His early characters 
exemplify a deep female longing for more from life.
Late in This Side of Paradise, for example, emotionally 
fragile Amory Blaine stumbles upon Eleanor Savage 
whilst sauntering about the Maryland countryside (207).  
Fitzgerald introduces this new character to readers in the 
midst of Amory’s prolonged and chronic convalescence 
after Rosalind Connage breaks off their engagement.  
Eleanor serves as a love interest, therapeutic friend, 
and conversational other to Amory.  Discussing poetry 
and philosophy, Eleanor not only posits her desires in 
juxtaposition to the lingering Victorian expectations of 
women in her day but also serves as soothsayer to the 
demands which would be placed on females by the advent of 
second-wave feminism:
‘Rotten, rotten world,’ broke out Eleanor suddenly, 
‘and the wretchedest thing is me- oh, why am I a 
girl?  Why am I not stupid?  Look at you; you’re 
stupider than I am, not much but some, and you can 
lope about and get bored and then lope somewhere 
else, and you can play around with girls without 
being involved in meshes of sentiment, and you can 
do anything and be justified- and here am I with the 
brains to do everything, yet tied to the sinking ship 
of future matrimony.  If I were born a hundred years 
from now, well and good, but now what’s in store for 
me- I have to marry that goes without saying.  Who?  
I’m too bright for most men, yet I have to descend to 
their level and let them patronize my intellect to get 
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their attention.  Every year that I don’t marry I’ve 
got less chance for a first-class man.’ (219)
Astutely, Fitzgerald employs Eleanor’s character to 
address other issues of inequality women faced in the 
1910s and 20s, issues which would remain present even 
by feminism’s second-wave era.  Friedan discusses the 
lengths women would go to in order to procure potential 
suitors:  taking on multiple jobs, treating higher education 
exclusively as an arena by which to find a husband (16, 25).  
In some cases, women experienced extreme psychological 
and emotional duress due to the pressure society put on them 
to become housewives and mothers, requiring psychiatric 
treatment or therapy (19, 25).  Eleanor bears witness to this 
pressure.  At the apex of her confessional rant, she steers 
the horse that she has been riding toward a cliff and nearly 
falls over the edge, jumping off the horse just in the knick 
of time (221).  Though this scene may appear markedly 
melodramatic to readers today, Fitzgerald was attempting 
to demonstrate the earnest desperation of women in his 
generation, revealing society’s need for a wave of feminism 
more radical than that of the first-wavers of his time.
Although, with her hyperbolic language, Eleanor’s 
character can come off as immature  or unrealistic, if taken 
as a proto-second-wave exponent of feminine neurosis 
concerning the “problem that has no name” (Friedan 19), 
then readers do more than excuse her; they empathize with 
her.  Some might deem that her characterization and overall 
demeanor nullify any feminist prophecy she represents.  
However, as James L.W. West III argues,  Fitzgerald created 
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Eleanor’s character in a “salvaged” portion of The Romantic 
Egotist, an unpublished novel which he completed prior 
to This Side of Paradise (68).  If critics have complained 
of the disparity in quality between The Great Gatsby and 
This Side of Paradise, then one can understand the disparity 
which must exist between the latter and The Romantic 
Egotist.  When Fitzgerald wrote Eleanor into existence, 
his writing had not yet developed the level of polish it 
would later receive; Eleanor’s representing the “woman 
question” insightfully in spite of her flaws and her creator’s 
inexperience speaks to her credibility.
Threads of proto-Friedan ideas also reveal themselves in 
Fitzgerald’s early short stories.  In fact, critics have said 
“[t]he women in Flappers and Philosophers who reject 
males and marriage… are among [its] most memorable 
characters” (Petry 29).  In the collection’s “The Ice 
Palace,” Southern belle Sally Carrol Happer believes she 
will find matrimonial and womanly fulfillment through 
her engagement to wealthy northerner Harry Bellamy.  
Throughout her life she dreams of leaving her small 
Georgian town to see the world.  When Sally goes north and 
stays with Harry’s family, she realizes that the cold climate, 
the isolating and chilly personalities inhabiting the Bellamy 
house, and the prospect of idle domestic relaxation will not 
satisfy her.  She struggles throughout the story to articulate 
feelings that Friedan would later characterize as “the 
problem that has no name” and ultimately flees suffocation 
and marriage to return to the airy, warm, unfettered expanse 
of her small hometown (47, 73).  Likewise, in Fitzgerald’s 
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story “The Cut-Glass Bowl,” housewife Evylyn Piper has 
nothing with which to occupy herself other than domestic 
responsibilities, an exceptionally humdrum husband, and 
nosy tea- and lunch-time chatter with other housewives 
(106-107).  Driven to find some meaning or excitement, she 
briefly has an affair with another man (109).
Another crucial component by which Fitzgerald exposes 
himself as an unwitting proto-second-waver presents itself 
through the study of feminist ethics.  By feminist ethics, 
I refer to the feminist response to traditional theories of 
ethics and decision-making processes, as defined by Carol 
Gilligan.  In her landmark book In a Different Voice, Gilligan 
argues that the classic male-based theories of psychology 
cannot apply to all people, asserting that many women 
make decisions predicated upon more relationship-based 
approaches.  The book reveals that traditional means of 
judging a decision as correct or incorrect, as essentially 
masculine or feminine, are incompatible with the way many 
people think.  Gilligan ascribes the relational approach to 
females in light of gender formation at birth:
For boys and men, separation and individuation are 
critically tied to gender identity since separation 
from the mother is essential for the development 
of masculinity.  For girls and women, issues of 
femininity or feminine identity do not depend on the 
achievement of separation from the mother or on the 
progress of individuation. (8)
Thus, women can feel a holistic connection with the 
others in their world having found themselves on the 
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same team, so to speak, as their mother-figures upon birth, 
allowing them to take a less legalistic, more caring approach 
to solving problems.  Men, however, see themselves 
as different from their mothers and therefore develop a 
discontinuous understanding of the world which upholds an 
individual’s rights.
Third-wave and some second-wave feminists alike 
have disagreed with Gilligan’s assertions.  Cressida Heyes 
acknowledges that third-wave members feel “that Gilligan 
reifies and draws overly general conclusions about women 
from the experiences of only a small group” (143).  Many 
feminists feel she imposes her “ethic of care” upon women, 
using “broad general categories” which “are inclined 
to erase historically, culturally, and politically salient 
differences” among women and men alike across different 
societies (Heyes 146-147).  Feminists from both waves 
have questioned Gilligan’s empirical methods, claiming 
that among the relatively small pool of subjects interviewed 
and studied, a noteworthy disparity still emerged in the 
data collected from members of the same gender.  Third-
wave feminists have also had particular complaints with 
the middle-class, Caucasian demographic of Gilligan’s 
aforementioned research subjects.  Some second-wavers 
distance themselves from Gilligan’s work because her 
relationship-based descriptions of women’s psychology 
sound similar to the domestic familial role Friedan rails so 
loudly against (210).  In light of such hostility within the 
feminist camp itself, one might question the wisdom of 
examining Fitzgerald’s underlying prototypical feminist 
41
sensibilities through Gilligan’s lens.
Though Gilligan’s work may not sound like feminism, 
it belongs to the second-wave camp, with valid work 
contributing to the movement’s aims.  Heyes lumps 
Gilligan’s work with the “‘second-wave’… dominant 
feminist theories of the 1970s which brought feminist 
political movements into academia to challenge the literal 
and implicit exclusion and derogation of women” (142).  
Moreover, Heyes’ definition of third-wave feminism defines 
itself in contrast to second-wave work such as Gilligan’s.  
She claims that part of what keeps third-wave feminism’s 
viable philosophical ascendancy “premature” stems from its 
members’ hostility toward the “essentialist” theories Gilligan 
and her like-minded colleagues hold (142).  Thus, examining 
the decision-making processes of Fitzgerald’s male and 
female characters in light of Gilligan’s masculine-individual 
and feminine-relational classifications remains important in 
demonstrating how he anticipates second-wave feminism.
Interestingly, Fitzgerald will often take female characters 
and give them “masculine” attributes in terms of traditional 
psychology, while his male characters he will often depict as 
“feminine” in nature.  Perhaps without realizing it, Fitzgerald 
employs a deft understanding of psychology in order to 
purposively empower females and disenfranchise males, one 
which contemporary readers could correlate to Gilligan’s 
controversial second-wave theories on gender constructs in 
moral development.
For instance, Amory Blaine never even differentiates 
from his mother Beatrice to earn his “masculine” identity.  
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Christened “delicate” and “charming” by his mother, by 
“five [Amory] was a delightful companion for her… [for] 
while more or less fortunate little… boys were defying 
governesses… [he was] deriving a highly specialized 
education from his mother.”  Fitzgerald describes Amory’s 
“tangled” hair when peering at his mother as a metaphor 
of their connection, with implications far deeper than 
the boy’s tousled head (13, 12).  Though Amory would 
develop something in the way of his own personality as he 
advances through adolescence and several prep schools, 
Amory struggles to become anything more than a composite 
character comprised of his new experiences and his mother:  
“[b]ut the Minneapolis years were not thick enough to 
conceal the ‘Amory plus Beatrice’” (37).  Though Fitzgerald 
asserts countless times afterward that St. Regis and other 
future schools “painfully drill Beatrice out of him,” the close 
reader has a hard time believing it (37).  Any separation he 
does achieve gets swiftly negated by a quick, compulsive 
attachment to other females:  Isabelle, Clara, Rosalind, and 
Eleanor (63, 130,158, 206).  Interestingly, the preceding list 
actually fails to include those females earlier in the novel 
with whom Amory connectively scaffolds his identity prior 
to his identity-separation from Beatrice, a separation which 
is debatable at best.  As Catherine B. Burroughs says, 
“[w]hen loving women, Fitzgerald’s men often assume the 
posture of emotional dependents” (52).
Much evidence supports Amory’s inability to stand 
alone as his own man.  After Amory and Isabelle have met 
only once, her cousin Sally claims that Amory’s “‘simply 
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mad to see [her] again’” (64).  Though the author himself 
admits this description as an “exaggeration,” Sally’s words 
reflect the truth of the connection her cousin and Amory 
would swiftly form (64).  Soon Fitzgerald himself begins 
narrating the descriptions of Isabelle and Amory as one 
entity:  “[they] were distinctly not innocent, nor were they 
particularly brazen” (68).  The protagonist cannot last any 
substantial time at Princeton without latching himself to a 
strong female.  Later in the novel, after quickly falling for 
a widowed mother of two, Clara Page, Amory declares his 
love and his desire to marry her (137).  Though she sensibly 
refuses, their dialogue reveals that in the short time they 
knew each other, Amory had already begun feeling that “any 
latent greatness” he had possessed was linked with her (137). 
Moreover, he admits to her that he has not a “bit of will,” 
that he is “a slave to [his] emotions, to [his] likes, to [his] 
hatred of boredom, [and] to most of [his] desires” (135).  
Amory himself realizes his own lack of a self-sufficient, self-
sustaining identity when alone.  Of Amory and Eleanor late 
in the novel, Fitzgerald writes that the protagonist “had loved 
himself in [her], so now what he hated was only a mirror” 
(222).  Amory does not perceive Eleanor as a person separate 
from himself but as a temporary extension of his self.
Opponents to my stance might argue that Fitzgerald 
finally grants Amory a masculine identity at the novel’s 
close.  Readers might think Amory’s lonely final epiphany, 
“I know myself… but that is all,” represents his belated 
separation and differentiation from the female other from 
which he perpetually derives his relational identity (260).  
44
Fitzgerald drew inspiration from writers in his modernist 
cohort such as James Joyce, specifically drawing inspiration 
from the latter’s A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man in 
composing This Side of Paradise (Tanner 1).  Amory even 
cites Portrait as a novel which leaves him “puzzled and 
depressed” while convalescing over Rosalind (195).  One 
might argue Amory’s epiphany parallels that of Joyce’s 
protagonist Stephen Dedalus.  When Stephen finds himself 
on the brink of a life in the priesthood, he suddenly realizes 
that “[h]is destiny was to be elusive of the social or religious 
orders… destined to learn his own wisdom apart from 
others” and crosses the bridge from clergy to poet, writer, 
and priest of no one but himself (Joyce 162).  Here Stephen 
separates from all those he is psychologically connected 
with and propels forward in prototypical modernist fashion.  
Fitzgerald attempts to mimic this transformation with Amory 
by insufficiently naming Paradise’s final chapter “The 
Egotist Becomes a Personage.”  However, Amory has no 
creative path down which he can trod at the novel’s finale; 
though “free from all hysteria” and finding “all Gods dead, 
all wars fought, all faiths in man shaken,” no action is left 
within his power but to “sleep deep through many nights” 
(260).  Fitzgerald nullifies any impotent masculinity Amory 
gains from his denouncement of the world by following 
his great speech with the whimper, “But- oh, Rosalind! 
Rosalind!... [i]t’s all a poor substitute at best” (260).  In 
terms of Gilligan’s gender constructs, Fitzgerald’s picaresque 
boyhood hero embodies the feminine.  The author would 
continue this trend later in The Great Gatsby; critic Frances 
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Kerr reiterates H.L. Mencken’s sentiments regarding 
Fitzgerald by asserting that Gatsby “is a man who seems like 
a woman,” whose “manhood is negated” (409, 421).
In contrast, once readers see past her fur-wearing 
exterior, Amory’s college flame Isabelle leans not toward 
the feminine.  Fitzgerald writes that Isabelle feels “on equal 
terms” with Amory, strong-willed and “quite capable of 
staging her own romances” (64).  Of her empowering allure, 
Fitzgerald writes that “her sophistication had been absorbed 
from the boys who dangled on her favor… [and that] her 
capacity for love affairs was limited only by the number 
of the [sic] susceptible within telephone distance” (65).  
Milton Stern attributes such personality “absorption” to her 
“irresponsible selfishness” (75).  Instead of attaching herself 
onto others in a symbiotic or identity-deriving attachment, 
she harvests what she can from others for herself.  It comes 
as hardly a surprise when their relationship ends, with their 
interplay serving as a foreshadowing of the characters and 
circumstances Amory will encounter later.
Deeper into the novel, Fitzgerald confers upon Rosalind 
Connage so many “masculine” attributes, that by Gilligan’s 
generalized gender categories, she might as well be a 
man.  Rosalind’s character gets “what she wants when she 
wants it and is prone to make everyone miserable when she 
doesn’t get it,” whose “philosophy is carpe diem for herself 
and laissez-faire for others,” feeling in herself “incipient 
meanness, conceit, cowardice, and petty dishonesty” (160-
161).  Rosalind appears from birth inherently differentiated 
from her mother and the people in her immediate 
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developmental environment:  “[t]here are long periods 
when she cordially loathes her whole family.”  Rosalind 
seems utterly indifferent to anyone’s attempt at forming an 
identity with her, never mind making one herself:  “[s]he 
wants people to like her, but if they do not it never worries 
or changes her” (161).  Despite having feelings for Amory 
and entertaining the connection he forms with her, she 
quickly severs it in order to accept the rich Dawson Ryder’s 
proposal.  She recognizes that in contrast to Amory, Dawson 
is “a strong one” and a real man, her match in selfish 
detachment.  Rosalind admits that to marry Amory would 
make her a “failure, and [she] never fail[s]” (181).  Gilligan 
discusses the fear of failure associated with masculinity 
and the fear of success associated with femininity due to 
the strain competition puts on relationships; once again 
Rosalind establishes herself as an embodiment of manhood 
(Gilligan 14-15).  Second-wave feminists might disagree that 
her marriage demonstrates any progress toward their aims, 
namely, freedom from domesticity, but Rosalind’s marriage 
does not constitute entrapment and isolation in the house.  
In her social and economic context, the marriage allows 
her to continue being “a little girl” (ironically), “dread[ing] 
responsibility,” and not “want[ing] to think about pots and 
kitchens and brooms” (183).  Surprisingly, her marriage 
with Dawson affords her more freedom, and she consciously 
makes her decision for her own benefit in this regard, no 
matter who gets hurt.
Isabelle’s characterization stands antithetical to that 
of the subservient Victorian woman or the domestically 
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enchained mid-twentieth-century housewife.  Rosalind’s 
decision transcends the mere political equality women 
receive with the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment; 
their decision-making process allows them to stand toe-to-
toe with men in the social or personal sphere.  Fitzgerald 
grants her this equity by the ironic see-sawing of male 
and female characters’ attributes.  By reining in men and 
empowering women, he provides females with a chance 
to create better lives for themselves while curtailing men’s 
historically broader options.  This trend ensconced in the 
early Fitzgerald also manifests itself in his first stories 
collected in Flappers and Philosophers.
In “Head and Shoulders,” young Ivy League prodigy 
Horace Tarbox meets and marries uneducated actress Marcia 
Meadow, leaving academia to support a family in New 
York.  To survive, Horace performs a trapeze act whilst 
Marcia pens a novel.  In an irony of role reversals, Marcia’s 
published novel earns her the public’s distinction as cultured, 
while Horace is deemed the unthinking breadwinner.  At 
the story’s conclusion, Horace cannot believe how things 
turned out:  his wife has achieved Friedan-evocative extra-
domestic public standing, while he finds himself the less 
career-oriented, Gilligan-reminiscent sustainer of family 
relationships (105).  As the story’s title suggests, Horace, 
who once proudly resided as “Head,” becomes relegated to 
the lowly position of “Shoulders,” while his wife occupies 
his former eminence.
“Bernice Bobs Her Hair” features female characters 
adopting male characteristics in order to assert their rights.  
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In this famous story, Fitzgerald presents Marjorie as 
dominating and man-eating, acting especially cruel toward 
her visiting cousin Bernice.  In fact, Bernice explicitly 
brands Marjorie “hard and selfish” with “hardly a feminine 
quality” in her (146).  Bernice represents the traditional 
female naïvely headed toward the orthodox domestic life 
for which she has been conditioned by American culture.  
Marjorie claims:
You little nut!  Girls like you are responsible for all 
the tiresome colorless marriages; all those ghastly 
inefficiencies that pass as feminine qualities.  What 
a blow it must be when a man with imagination 
marries the beautiful bundle of clothes that he’s 
been building ideals around, and fins that she’s just a 
weak, whining, cowardly mass of affectations! (146)
Marjorie feels little affection or connection with Bernice 
despite their blood relation, feeling her cousin needs 
correction.  Marjorie tricks and coerces Bernice into bobbing 
her hair, a scandalous hairstyle for conservative girls at the 
time (159-160).  When Marjorie’s lesson finally sinks into 
Bernice, the latter asserts herself and cuts Marjorie’s hair 
while sleeping (165).  In this way, Bernice places herself on 
equal footing with her hyper-masculine cousin.
Critics have suggested Fitzgerald wholeheartedly 
supports his character Marjorie in her efforts to fight for 
the evolution of womanhood.  Berman reminds readers that 
“[r]elics of Victorianism are often described by Fitzgerald 
as mindless, negligible, or senile” (33).  Considering 
Fitzgerald’s nostalgic, romantic sensibilities, such as his 
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affinity for poet Rupert Brooke, one cannot simply reduce 
his approach to Marjorie as belonging to an overarching 
out-with-the-old-in-with-the-new philosophy (West 5).  
Fitzgerald’s striving for gender equality would continue in 
his later work.  Consider, for example, Froehlich’s analysis 
of Jordan Baker’s overtly masculine character in The Great 
Gatsby.
Some readers may still remain unconvinced of 
Fitzgerald’s proto-second-wave feminism or even the first-
wave feminism through which he lived, citing instances of 
hyper-masculinity in his male characters.  Some may point 
to examples where Fitzgerald’s characters wish to become 
more masculine or assert their masculinity over others.  
Certainly, readers can find examples of hyper-masculinity 
in the stories “Dalyrimple Goes Wrong” and “The Four 
Fists” from Flappers and Philosophers.  In the former, hero 
of the Great War Henry Dalyrimple returns home only to 
unemployment.  Disgruntled, taking work far below what 
he feels he deserves, Dalyrimple turns to a life of theft, 
stealing by moonlight from the houses of the rich (188-
189, 192, 199).  His life of crime instills in him a newfound 
assertiveness, which makes him more aggressive in his 
day job and earns him prominence in the community and 
the promise of a political career (which, in turn, prompts 
his exit from after-hours thievery) (204, 206, 209-210).  
Dalyrimple appears cold and indifferent to his connections 
to the community, and yet he gets rewarded for it.  Likewise, 
successful businessman Samuel Meredith of “The Four 
Fists” involves himself in four different fights throughout his 
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life, each one prompted by his pursuit of a selfish aim, such 
as ascendancy over peers or an affair with a married woman, 
each one granting him experience for future endeavors 
(214, 217, 223).  Though Meredith excessively flaunts his 
masculinity, he gets rewarded for it as Dalyrimple does.
One example of hyper-masculinity present in Amory 
Blaine in This Side of Paradise manifests itself in the 
character’s football aspirations.  In order to become “one 
of the gods of [his] class” at Princeton, he joins the football 
team (47).  While such may not seem an excessive act 
of masculinity, the contrived circumstances surrounding 
Amory’s football experience suggest a thinly-veiled attempt 
on the author’s part to artificially inflate his protagonist’s 
masculinity.  Conveniently, Amory finds himself “playing 
quarterback” by his “second week” at school, performing 
well enough to be “paragraphed in the corners of the 
‘Princetonian’” newspaper.  His football experience 
gets halted not by any poor performance on the field or 
exceptionally demeaning defeat which would compromise 
his masculine image of strength but instead by a knee injury 
that “put[s] him out for the rest of the season” (48).  Cruel 
fate sidelines his athletic career, not unmanliness.
Others may still have hesitancy with regard to imposing 
proto-second-wave feminist interpretations on the self-
seeking behavior of Rosalind or the cold, unfeeling 
demeanor of Marjorie.  When people study Fitzgerald, 
however, they must take into account the glaring insecurities 
he harbored and how such feelings contributed to his 
overcompensating for the perceived lack of his characters’ 
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total masculinity by caricaturing them.  In particular, 
Michael Nowlin suggests Fitzgerald had deep insecurities 
concerning his masculinity which especially emerged in 
his attempt to reconcile his “vocation and identity” (59).  
His need for money would necessitate exorbitant short 
story writing, and yet the short story market to which he 
found himself chained was predominantly feminine (64).  
Writing in the modernist era, such a reality felt to him an 
artistic compromise, prompting guilt and shame over his 
slim creations (59, 66, 74).  Given the climate in which he 
wrote, some critics have even referred to some of his stories’ 
Southern settings as “feminine,” evidencing how easily a 
writer could betray the modernist cause (Forter 306).  A part 
of Fitzgerald coveted the overly masculine persona of writers 
like Hemingway, and such components of his psychology 
must be taken into account before dismissing his proto-
second-wave virtues.
Fitzgerald’s overcompensation also presents itself 
in his insistence that his characters see combat in World 
War I, despite having personalities largely incompatible 
with hardened veterans.  James H. Meredith supports this 
observation:  “[t]hroughout his adult life, Fitzgerald deeply 
regretted that he never clashed in combat among ‘ignorant 
armies’ because like the majority of unwitting young men 
of his generation, he believed that war was a necessary test 
of manhood” (163).  Dalyrimple from the story cited earlier 
and Amory Blaine from This Side of Paradise stand out as 
examples.  Critics have cited the difficulty they have had 
believing that Amory saw combat (West 55-56).  Fitzgerald 
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also possessed a life-long insecurity concerning his 
economic status.  As a boy, he would tell the apocryphal and 
imaginative tale of how a royal family left him as an infant 
upon his parents’ doorstep (Long 9).  Fitzgerald knew he was 
always just a boy from the middle class.  Evidence suggests 
Fitzgerald felt insecure in his creative self when compared 
to his wife Zelda.  Consistently, he put down her writing or, 
toward the end of their relationship, would claim she stole 
his material.  In reality, Fitzgerald would take small portions 
of her writing, such as diary entries, and include them in his 
books (West 58).  I do not report such theft here to prompt 
in readers any loss of respect or confidence in the author 
but merely to demonstrate the degree to which Fitzgerald’s 
inferiority complexes and traumas affected his work.  Failure 
to take into account such occluding factors would diminish 
his potential as a surprisingly anticipative feminist.
Such factors are important for scholars of Fitzgerald 
to reexamine periodically in light of the dynamic social 
contexts in which we live.  As Fitzgerald’s work continues 
to be assigned in contemporary classrooms, one must 
keep in mind his potential audiences and how they view 
women, gender, and feminism.  Some might assume that 
reading Fitzgerald in a feminist light has become a fruitless 
exercise given the conceivably “postfeminist” world we 
have inherited today.  However, such assumptions may 
prove false.  In her research, for example, Pamela Aronson 
discovered that some young woman today are uncertain 
about whether or not they would subscribe to feminist labels 
and are largely unaware of current areas of “persisting” 
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social and gender injustice (903).  Thus, examining 
Fitzgerald’s books through feminist lenses remains an 
activity which can either supplement students’ preexisting 
feminist knowledge or educate those who have no such 
preexisting feminist background.
It is impossible to plot the future course of feminist 
ideologies.  Projecting Fitzgerald’s relevance in the future 
also presents no guarantees.  However, some things seem to 
be here to stay, namely, the varied responses men and women 
will have toward literature.  The other day I talked with a 
female friend about Lost Generation writers.  She remarked 
“It seemed so much a boys’ club.”  To that, I replied, 
“[T]hat’s what I always liked about it.”  I realized then the 
power our perceived gender has on our readings and the 
sensitivity with which we must approach this construct 
in order to appreciate literary texts to the fullest.  The 
masculine interpretation which prompted my admiration 
for Fitzgerald serves as the force which might inhibit 
others from enjoying him.  Moreover, a feminist-slanted 
interpretation, which would have originally evoked my 
hostility toward Fitzgerald, serves as a way others might 
come to love his work.  We must offer due consideration to 
both conflicting sides of any given dichotomy; no one, man 
or woman, should feel excluded from Fitzgerald’s rich prose. 
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Vladimir Nabokov’s Singular Nature of  Reality:
A Close Reading of  Despair and Bend Sinister
Hannah Kim
Emory University
n Despair and Bend Sinister, Vladimir Nabokov utilizes 
various literary and narrative devices to study consciousness. 
Symbolism, unreliable narrators, and artifice present a 
literary reality that invites the readers to observe how each 
character’s consciousness builds the world it perceives. We 
are also exposed to different consciousness’ imperfections 
through which we are encouraged to reflect on our own 
mental and psychological inclinations. In the end, Nabokov 
points to the entirely individualistic and subjective nature 
of truth and suggests that we might never objectively know 
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Truth or Reality because everything we know and perceive 
is filtered through a biased mind. Instead, he stresses the 
importance of being aware of the necessarily unique way 
everyone perceives the world.
In Despair, mirrors symbolize the distorted way 
consciousness often perceives and interprets the world. 
“For Nabokov,” Ellen Pifer comments, “the world is not an 
objective entity but a universe embraced by consciousness” 
(127). In other words, reality does not exist apart from 
the mind that encounters it, and Nabokov compares 
consciousness to a mirror because the world we perceive is 
reflective of our inner world just as a mirror merely reflects 
what is before it. A distorted consciousness, like a colored 
mirror, produces a misrepresented version of reality that 
is colored by certain beliefs, emotions, and prejudices. 
Mirrors also don’t change shape unless shattered; comparing 
our mind to a mirror thus attests to our consciousness’ 
stubbornness as well. 
Within the novel, Hermann’s consciousness is colored 
by his unwavering belief that he has found his doppelgänger, 
and this causes Hermann to see the world entirely differently 
from everyone else. It is interesting to note that he dislikes 
mirrors. “Now that is a word I loathe, that ghastly thing!” 
exclaims Hermann, and he even writes that “the merely 
mention of it has just given [him] a nasty shock” (Despair 
27). Instead of seeing himself and the world as it really is, 
he relies on his own mind which repeatedly produces false 
doubles. Colored by his belief in a doppelgänger, Hermann 
imagines Felix to be his mirror image when really it is only 
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his consciousness reflecting distorted images: “for some ten 
seconds we kept looking into each other’s eyes.  Slowly I 
raised my right arm, but his left did not rise, as I had almost 
expected to do. I closed my left eye, but both his eyes 
remained open” (Despair 20). When he does encounter a 
true mirror, Hermann convinces himself that the reflection 
he sees is not himself, but Felix: “when at last I got back to 
my hotel room, I found there, amid mercurial shadows and 
framed in frizzly bronze, Felix awaiting me. Pale-faced and 
solemn he drew near. He was now well-shaven” (Despair 
22). 
Hermann’s repeated denial of Felix’s uniqueness 
dramatizes the subjective nature of reality in Despair. We see 
that Hermann had been aware of their physical differences 
from the beginning:
I possess large yellowish teeth; his are whiter and set 
more closely together, but is that really important? 
On my forehead a vein stands out like a capital M 
imperfectly drawn, but when I sleep my brow is as 
smooth as that of my double.  And those ears… the 
convolutions of his are but very slightly altered in 
comparison with mine: here more compressed, there 
smoothed out. We have eyes of the same shape, 
narrowly slit with sparse lashes, but his iris is paler 
than mine. (Despair 24)
Though he himself observes certain facial differences, 
Hermann insists that they are the same person. Again and 
again he considers the possibility that Felix might not 
be his double—“who knows, maybe he was not the least 
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like me after all” — but Hermann always returns to his 
original disposition (Despair 88). His ability to perceive 
Felix as his double while contrary evidence abound shows 
that “every item perceived by Nabokov’s narrators and 
protagonists similarly acts as a mirror of the observation of 
consciousness” (Pifer 127). In other words, what Hermann 
sees and fails to see are not indicative of what his sensory 
abilities are capable of, but what his consciousness is 
desirous of. This is why Hermann’s use of the phrase “to 
my eyes” is so important because it was his desire to see a 
doppelgänger that his eyes responded to (Despair 21). 
Hermann believing Felix to be his identical twin is 
not an isolated, one-time mistake because we see that his 
consciousness idealizes doubles and produces them over 
and over again. When travelling through a foreign town 
to meet Felix again, Hermann comes across what he takes 
to be one of Ardalion’s pictures and asks the store owner 
how she came to attain it. When she replies that her niece 
painted it, Hermann thinks “[W]ell, I’m damned! For had 
I not seen something very similar, if not identical, among 
Ardalion’s pictures?” (Despair 65) However, Hermann later 
discovers that the painting’s subjects are “not quite two 
roses and not quite a pipe, but a couple of large peaches 
and a glass ashtray” (Despair 93). Similarly, Hermann is 
prone to thinking that every face looks, more or less, the 
same. When Ardalion asserts that “every face is unique,” 
Hermann retorts “Well, now, really—unique! … Isn’t that 
going too far? Take for instance the definite types of human 
faces that exist in the world; say, zoological types. There are 
62
people with the features of apes; there is also the rat type, 
the swine type. Then take the resemblance to celebrities…” 
(Despair 43). Instead of perceiving individual differences 
in people, Hermann is busy categorizing. When he shares 
that he “longed passionately for [Ardalion] to start talking 
about doubles,” we observe that mirror image is a deep-
rooted obsession with Hermann—a tint to his mirror of 
consciousness (Despair 43). 
In addition to mirror symbolisms, Nabokov also employs 
an unreliable narrator to further suggest that consciousness 
is often misleading. In the introduction of Despair, Nabokov 
calls Hermann, our lying and exaggerating narrator, a 
“neurotic scoundrel” (Despair 11). From the very first 
sentence of the novel we can see Hermann’s inconsistent 
personality: “If I were not perfectly sure of my power to 
write and of my marvelous ability to express ideas with the 
utmost grace and vividness… So, more or less, I had thought 
of beginning of my tale” (Despair 13). The sentence lacks 
the “utmost grace” and logic that Hermann professes to 
possess, and the awkward phrases such as “well, as I was 
saying” and “I think I ought to inform the reader” insinuate 
that Hermann is not, in fact, perfectly sure of his literary 
talent (Despair 14). We also see that Hermann has no qualms 
about lying when he confesses, “[T]hat bit about my mother 
was a deliberate lie […] I could, of course have crossed it 
out, but I purposely leave it there as a sample of one of my 
essential traits: my light-hearted, inspired lying” (Despair 
14). Lastly, Hermann seems to acknowledge that his writing 
is imperfect and unreliable because he is writing from 
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memory: 
The pines sought gently, snow lay about, with bald 
patches of soil showing black. What nonsense! How 
could there by snow in June? Ought to be crossed  
out, were it not wicked to erase; for the real author 
is not I, but my impatient         memory. Understand 
it just as you please; it is none of my business. 
(Despair 41)
It is particularly insightful for Hermann to have noticed 
that it is not his being itself narrating but his flawed and 
biased memory retracing the story. Indeed, it is our unique 
consciousness that stumbles upon the world to make sense 
of whatever it encounters. Furthermore, since all minds have 
different inclinations, bias and errors are to be expected. 
 Lastly, Nabokov uses humorous cases of extreme 
situational irony to convey how the folly of our 
consciousness can be comical at times. To the end Hermann 
refuses to believe that his “art,” or the foolish murder of 
Felix, has failed because he and Felix bear no resemblance. 
Instead, he complains,“[A]ll that disgusting mess is due 
to the inertia, pigheadedness, prejudice of humans, failing 
to recognize me in the corpse of my flawless double” 
(Despair 162). Of course, this is extremely ironic because 
it was precisely this stubborn bias of his mind that led him 
to his demise. Similarly, when first encountering Felix, 
Hermann comments that it would only be “the partiality 
and fallaciousness of human eyesight” that would lead 
others to miss their resemblance (Despair 19). Through 
these comically ironic situations, Nabokov comments on the 
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inherent difficulty consciousness faces in becoming aware of 
its own limitations. 
If mirrors in Despair express consciousness’ tendency 
to project whatever is already within itself, liquids in Bend 
Sinister reflect consciousness’ fluid nature. The motif of 
liquid blots reoccurs throughout the novel. The very first 
scene in the book contains an oblong puddle, and the 
subsequent chapter takes place over a bridge where Krug 
feels “an intimate connection with the black lacquered 
water lapping and heaving under the stone arches of the 
bridge” (Bend Sinister 14). Here, the black “heaving” water 
seems to reflect Krug’s own self, a gloomy man who had 
been crying and struggling. The liquid imagery returns 
again when Dr. Alexander’s pen bleeds ink and Krug sees 
the ink blot, “a fancy footprint or the spatulate outline of a 
puddle” (Bend Sinister 50). Lastly, Skotoma, the founder of 
Ekwilism, makes explicit the comparison between human 
consciousness, liquid, and container:
Human beings, he said, were so many vessels 
containing unequal portions of this essentially 
uniform consciousness. It was, however, quite 
possible, he maintained, to regulate the capacity 
of the human vessels […] either by grading the 
contents or by eliminating the fancy vessels and 
adopting a standard size. (Bend Sinister 68)
Because he believed consciousness to be fluid and 
malleable, Skotoma strove to regulate the shape of 
consciousness by limiting the “vessels”—people’s beliefs, 
emotions, and expressions. 
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In Krug’s case, everything he experiences is molded 
according to his prevailing grief, just as everything Hermann 
sees is colored by his belief in a doppelgänger. Krug asserts 
in the beginning that “the operation has not been successful 
and [that his] wife will die” (Bend Sinister 6). The despair 
resulting from this tragic occasion proceeds to affect 
everything Krug observes. For instance, illusions of Olga 
flash across Krug’s mind while he is crossing the bridge: 
“Suddenly, with the vividness of a praedormital image or 
of a bright-robed lady on stained glass, she drifted across 
his retina, in profile, carrying something[…] and the wall 
dissolved, the torrent was loosed again” (Bend Sinister 13). 
The ink blot Krug observes from Dr. Alexander’s pen takes 
the shape of a puddle, the first thing Krug observed when 
looking outside the hospital window after Olga’s death. 
Similarly, when Paduk spills milk by knocking down the 
tumbler, “what was left of the milk made a kidney-shaped 
white puddle on the desk” (Bend Sinister 132). Kidney 
failure, of course, was the cause of Olga’s death, and the 
puddle image returns again and again. “The world Krug 
perceives,” Pifer explains, “is a psychic landscape, centered 
about his own preoccupations and concerns […] Everything 
Krug perceives is transmuted and infused by the grief, the 
love, the loss he experiences at Olga’s death” (81). Thus 
in Bend Sinister, the ever-conforming liquid motif reveals 
the workings of Krug’s consciousness— his affected mind 
whose perception of the world is conditioned by his despair. 
 Furthermore, by suggesting that it was Krug’s 
mental state that brought about his own demise, Nabokov 
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points to the danger of not being aware of the way one’s 
consciousness interprets the world. As an academic, Krug 
is always trying to reason the world out, and he fails to 
understand the brutality of the Ekwilist regime simply 
because he does not perceive its legitimacy. “My dear 
friend, you know well my esteem for you,” President 
Azureus pleads, “but you are a dreamer, a thinker. You do 
not realize the circumstances” (Bend Sinister 47). Instead 
of considering the dangers of Paduk’s regime, Krug holds 
onto his stubborn belief that he is somehow untouchable. 
His obliviousness is a partial result of his childhood 
memory of bullying Paduk. Krug recalls that “toad was 
[Paduk’s] nickname,” confessing that he was “something 
of a bully” who used to “trip [Paduk] up and sit upon his 
face” (Bend Sinister 46). Krug’s heavy reliance on the past 
manifests itself through his unwillingness to pay the proper 
respect to Paduk during his interview. Alarmed by Krug’s 
condescending manner, the surrounding guards warn that 
“this is still not the right manner” and that he “should bear in 
mind that notwithstanding the narrow and fragile bridge of 
school memories uniting the two sides, these are separated 
in depth by an abyss of power and dignity which even a 
great philosopher cannot hope to measure” (Bend Sinister 
129). Though he is ordered not to “indulge in this atrocious 
familiarity,” Krug continues to anger Paduk and the guards 
(Bend Sinister 129). 
Krug’s pride, philosophic tendencies, and apathy make 
it difficult for Krug to protect himself and David from 
Paduk’s totalitarian government. Indeed, Krug is unable 
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to foresee David’s impending danger despite the obvious 
hints. Entrenched in his own perception of reality, Krug 
entirely disregards others’ reality—Paduk’s and President 
Azerues’, among others— and brings about his own 
tragic end. Laurie Clancy aptly observes that “although 
[Nabokov’s] sympathies are patently with Krug, the author 
is nevertheless careful to point out the flaws in Krug’s 
greatness—his arrogance and foolish conviction of his own 
safety and failure to see how his presence endangers his 
friends” (96). For instance, though Krug has had the chance 
to escape the country, he delays for no apparent reason. By 
blinding Krug to the well-apparent fact that Mariette is a spy, 
Nabokov exposes how illogical our minds can be when we 
are insistent upon our own reality. The able reader is quick to 
pick up on Marietta’s suspicious motives given that she had 
worked for a well-known artist until he suddenly was sent to 
a prison camp, not to mention that she randomly shows up at 
Krug’s door. Even Krug’s intuition seems to respond to these 
hints when he comments that “there was something rather 
irritating about her,” but he fails to act upon it (Bend Sinister 
123). Thus Nabokov suggests that it is not enough merely to 
know that our consciousness is biased; one should at least 
have a faint idea of one’s own inclinations if one wishes to 
avoid Hermann and Krug’s fate. 
Nabokov also dramatizes the unreliable and artificial 
nature of reality in Bend Sinister by robbing his characters 
of autonomy; the use of artifice reminds the reader that there 
is no objective reality. The narrator repeatedly makes his 
presence felt by calling Krug his “favorite character” and 
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by employing changes in narrative voices (135). The reality 
in Bend Sinister is full of shifting perspectives. Whereas 
the first chapter begins with Krug’s first-person narrative, 
the second chapter switches to an omniscient third person 
narrator that observes Krug. The change in gaze, voice, and 
awareness between “my wife will die” and “Krug halted 
in the doorway” conveys that there are always at least two 
different angles to any given reality (Bend Sinister 7). The 
shifting identity of narrative voices makes it difficult for 
the reader to clearly distinguish between what is real and 
what is imagined in the novel (Clancy 95). The narrator 
also provides the reader with multiple versions of the story; 
after describing Krug’s meeting with Paduk, the narrator 
interrupts, “[N]o, it did not go on quite like that. In the 
first place Paduk was silent during most of the interview” 
(Bend Sinister 131). Nabokov even addresses Krug directly 
towards the end of the novel when he writes: “the echoing 
steps retreated. Silence. Now, at last, you may think” (202). 
By repeatedly disrupting the seemingly real world of Bend 
Sinister, Nabokov suggests that the world we live in, like 
Krug’s world, is entirely dependent on human consciousness. 
The biggest authorial intervention occurs at the end of 
the novel when Krug finds that he is a mere character at the 
whim of the narrator, and it is important for us to note that 
our position is not too different from Krug’s; we, too, are 
at the whims of the universe and our own consciousness 
and will therefore never truly and objectively understand 
reality. Towards the end of Bend Sinister, the narrator shares 
that he “felt a pang of pity for Adam and slid towards him 
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along an inclined beam of pale light—causing instantaneous 
madness” (203). This madness opens Krug’s eyes to the 
“simple reality” that “he and his son and wife and everybody 
else are merely [Nabokov]’s whims,” that everything is “only 
absurd mirages, illusions oppressive to Krug during his brief 
spell of being” (Bend Sinister vii). Aware of the true nature 
of his existence, Krug cries, “[Y]ou silly people […] what on 
earth are you afraid of? What does it all matter? Ridiculous! 
Same as those infantile pleasures—Olga and the boy taking 
part in some silly theatricals, she getting drowned, he losing 
his life or something in a railway accident. What on earth 
does it matter?” (Bend Sinister 206) The narrator even saves 
Krug from dying by suddenly putting an end to the novel, 
an artifice Nabokov describes as “slippery sophism, a play 
upon words” (210). However, Nabokov does not employ 
these extreme interventions solely to exercise his omnipotent 
power as the creator or even to take the easy way out. 
Instead, by using artifice to create a dream-like world where 
illusion and reality overlap, Nabokov invites the reader to 
compare his reality to that of Krug’s:
The origins of our existence are ultimately 
mysterious, remaining beyond the reach of the words 
we summon to define and describe. Hedged by the 
unknown surrounding us, we struggle, like Adam 
Krug, to peer beyond the limits of our condition, 
seeking to populate the terrifyingly empty spaces 
with our words and images. (Pifer 95)
By witnessing Krug’s lack of autonomy, we become 
aware of the possibility that our reality, too, is never 
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concrete, independent, and objective.
In the end, symbolism, unreliable narrators, and 
artifice in Despair and Bend Sinister show that life is a 
series of biased impressions and that every consciousness 
is necessarily singular. Each consciousness builds the 
individual’s world, and this is why the unique nature of 
consciousness is crucial; there is no such thing as average 
reality because our subjective minds render it impossible 
for us to grasp the objective truth—if there is any at all. 
Both novels uphold the supremacy of the individual 
consciousness, no matter how imperfect it may be. Lastly, 
because each individual consciousness is unique, to ignore 
or suppress someone’s consciousness is to wipe out his or 
her world and existence. Nabokov seems to speak directly 
through Ardalion in Despair: “in the whole world there 
are not, and cannot be, two men alike, however well you 
disguise them” (Despair 170). Nabokov defends every 
consciousness’ singularity, and it is only the deranged or the 
evil—such as Hermann and Paduk— who believe in true 
doubles.  
 
 
71
Works Cited
Clancy, Laurie. The Novels of Vladimir Nabokov. London: 
 Macmillan, 1984. Print.
Nabokov, Vladimir. Introduction. Bend Sinister. 1947. New 
 York: Penguin, 1965. Print.
---, ---. Bend Sinister. London: Weidenfeld and 
 Nicolson, 1947. Print.
---, ---. Despair. 1937. New York: Penguin, 1965. 
 Print.
Pifer, Ellen. Nabokov and the Nobel. Cambridge, MA: 
 Harvard UP, 1980. Print.
72
Submission Guidelines
The Oswald Review is a refereed undergraduate journal of 
criticism and research in the discipline of English.  Published 
annually, The Oswald Review accepts submissions from 
undergraduates in this country and abroad (with a professor’s 
endorsement).
Guidelines:
Submit each manuscript as a separate email attachment in 
Microsoft Word.  TOR discourages simultaneous submission 
to other journals.
All text should be provided in current MLA format, justified 
left only and without headers and footers.  Endnotes should 
be avoided.
Title page:
 title of work; author’s name; postal address  
 (both local and permanent); phone number 
 (both school and home, if applicable); email 
 address (both school and home, if 
 applicable); name and address of college or 
 university; name and department of 
 endorsing professor.
Professor’s note (this can be sent as a separate email 
message) that work is original with the student for a specific 
course.
73
Length:  5-25 pages.
Typeface:  Times New Roman 12 pt.
Deadline for submissions:  March 31 (or nearest business 
day).
Notification of acceptance by email:  July 30
Email to tomm@usca.edu 
Tom Mack, Ph.D.
G. L. Toole Professor of English
Carolina Trustee Professor
Department of English
University of South Carolina Aiken
471 University Parkway
Aiken, SC 29801
 
74
Endorsing Professors
Dr. Elizabeth Rambo
Department of English 
Campbell University
Buies Creek, NC
Dr. Crystal Downing
Department of English
Messiah College
Grantham, PA
Dr. Paul Kelleher
Director of Undergraduate Studies
Department of English
Emory University
Atlanta, GA
75ISSN  1520-9679
The Oswald Review
Department of English
University of South Carolina Aiken
471 University Parkway
Aiken, SC 29801
